The forthcoming judgment in Myanmar’s genocide case invites two different tests of success. One concerns legal responsibility; the other concerns whether Rohingya people become safer and regain meaningful rights. Those tests should not be collapsed. Judges have spent seven years considering Gambia’s allegations, while more than a million Rohingya remain in Bangladesh. The policy implication is that accountability needs a protection strategy alongside it: a legal milestone cannot, by itself, end displacement.

The court’s own timeline makes that distinction important. In 2020, it ordered Myanmar to prevent acts covered by the Genocide Convention, before deciding the merits of the genocide allegation. Prevention was therefore already an obligation under that order, not something awaiting a final verdict. Neither archive provides a systematic compliance assessment. Governments responding to the judgment should consequently ask what protective measures were implemented and what remains missing, rather than presenting the verdict as the starting point for responsibility.

That approach need not prejudge the contested legal question. The Guardian identifies proof of intent to destroy a protected group as a central issue; survivor representative Antonia Mulvey argues that repeated patterns of attacks establish that intent. Myanmar denies genocide and says its operations answered insurgent attacks. These positions are not judicial findings. Rigorous scrutiny matters precisely because the allegation is so serious. But uncertainty about the ultimate legal classification is not a sound policy reason to postpone protection.

A durable protection agenda would also look beyond stopping military attacks. The Guardian reports decades of citizenship deprivation and increasing discrimination against Rohingya people. That history suggests a structural test for any proposed solution: does it change the conditions of exclusion, or merely relocate people within them? Measuring success only by refugee departures from Bangladesh would miss this distinction. Safety, citizenship and equal treatment should be assessed separately from the number of people who cross a border.

Enforcement presents another gap between recognition and results. Supporters of the case want restrictions on arms transfers and jet-fuel supplies; the Guardian also reports that Security Council divisions make stronger action unlikely. These proposals deserve examination, not automatic claims of effectiveness. The archives do not establish how much leverage particular suppliers hold or what civilian consequences restrictions might bring. A credible response would explain how each measure could reduce perpetrators’ capacity for abuse while assessing risks to civilians.

Nor should parallel prosecutions be mistaken for a complete remedy. The ICJ addresses state responsibility, while the ICC prosecutes individuals; the reported 2024 move against Min Aung Hlaing was a prosecutor’s request for an arrest warrant, not a conviction. These mechanisms can pursue different forms of accountability without delivering everyday security themselves. The strongest public-policy response would therefore track three outcomes separately: legal findings, measures that constrain further abuse, and restoration of rights. Progress on one should not conceal stagnation on the others.